A Karnes County Sheriff’s Office internal investigation into Jail Administrator Macedonio “Mace” Martinez laid out an unusually broad list of alleged deficiencies, pairing each concern with Martinez’s sworn response before a disciplinary board ultimately sustained the allegation and terminated his employment. The final disciplinary acknowledgment states that the finding was sustained under Jail and Detention Policy 2.04, “Delegation of Authority,” and that termination of employment was imposed effective December 17, 2025. That policy states, in part, that “The Sheriff has the sole authority to appoint a Jail Administrator who has full responsibility for the management and operational control of the jail, its resources, and the inmates housed within.”

A case built on accumulation, not one incident

Investigators explicitly said the accusation was not based on one isolated event. In a November 25, 2025, policy violation notice, Lt. D.J. Carrothers told Martinez, “There is no one distinct event on which your suspected violation is based upon, rather the policy violation is a culmination of management and operational failures on your part as the KCSO Jail Administrator.” A longer investigative summary repeated that statement, stating the “several issues discussed herein” were to “be considered as a whole” in deciding whether Martinez failed to comply with Policy 2.04.

The file also shows Martinez had already been formally disciplined before the final termination. A November 5, 2025, written disciplinary record states that Sheriff Bailey and Chief Deputy Scott Kotara reviewed 34 inmate files and found that 12 needed new classifications, 19 needed signatures on various forms, some had missing phone log information, and two were missing a pen pack. Supervisors wrote that deficiencies of that kind “could potentially put the jail out of commission and is unacceptable.” Martinez’s recorded explanation was that he had assigned the task to Lt. Resendez, but supervisors responded that while Policy 02.04 allowed task assignment, Policy 02.10 on quality assurance still required scheduled and random observation of employees and processes, and they concluded he had “failed to do” that. 

Administrative leave, warning, and the path to termination

On November 20, 2025, Martinez was formally placed on administrative leave by Sheriff Steven Bailey. The leave order required him to remain at home during duty hours, be available by telephone, refrain from official duties, avoid off-duty jobs, and not carry his badge, identification card, or a weapon. The same day, he was served with an administrative warning telling him he was required to answer questions truthfully and cooperate with the investigation, and that he could face discipline “up to and including termination of your employment.”

Martinez was later told his disciplinary review board hearing was tentatively scheduled for December 17, 2025, and then formally notified that it would be held that morning in the KCSO conference room. He replied by email, “Thank you, Lieutenant! I will be there.” The termination acknowledgment signed that same day states the Disciplinary Review Board finding was “Sustained” and that the “Imposed Discipline” was “Termination of Employment.”

Deficiency 1: Veteran-status reporting

The first concern investigators listed was compliance with Texas Commission on Jail Standards requirements for reporting verified veteran inmates to the Texas Veterans Commission, the county veteran service officer, and any court where charges were pending. In his sworn affidavit, Martinez wrote, “I run my VRSS reports as often as possible, sometimes twice a week if I remember to do so,” and added, “Regrettably, this report has slipped my mind from time to time because it is a new requirement. I take full responsibility for that.” Investigators then contrasted that admission with a statement from Karnes County veteran’s service officer Blake Sanchez, who said he had “never received this required report from the KCSO Jail.” The investigative summary also noted that the jail’s Veteran Status Verification Log reflected only nine veterans incarcerated since Jan. 1, 2025, and treated the missed reporting as an example of weak compliance tracking. 

Deficiency 2: Trustee Mario Rangel’s use of a jail telephone

Investigators next focused on an incident in which Trustee Inmate Mario Rangel used the booking desk telephone on September 10, 2025, allegedly to call his sister and warn her about an impending gambling establishment raid. Martinez’s sworn response was short and direct, “I was unaware that Rangel was able to use the phone in the booking area on the evening of September 10, 2025,” and he added, “I did not approve that call.” The investigative summary responded by noting that a detention officer was at the booking desk while Rangel used the phone “without permission but, also, without being stopped from using the telephone,” and investigators added that “No disciplinary action was taken on either DO Garza or Trustee Inmate Rangel for this incident.”

Deficiencies 3 and 4: Rangel sleeping in the laundry room instead of an assigned cell

A major portion of the packet focuses on Mario Rangel being allowed to sleep in the jail laundry rather than in his assigned housing area. Martinez responded that Rangel’s “actual housing area was in M1” as of November 20, 2025, and said Rangel “would use a mat to relax on throughout the day to avoid constant in-and-out of dorm M1 each time he was needed for something.” Martinez insisted, “I did not authorize that as a housing area, nor was it used as one,” and, on the follow-up question about compliance with single-cell standards, he wrote, “I could see this being an issue had Rangel been housed in the laundry room area for some reason. However, that is not the case.” 

Investigators disputed that response. They cited a still image dated November 15, 2025, around 11:43 a.m. showing Rangel asleep on a mattress in the laundry room while jail records simultaneously reflected him assigned elsewhere, and wrote that the “jail laundry was, in essence, being used as Rangel’s cell in violation of jail standards.” The summary further said Martinez’s explanation failed to answer “who authorized and how long was Rangel allowed to sleep in the jail laundry,” and included a detention officer’s statement that “from my best recollection he’s been doing that sense [sic] I started in March.” Investigators also stressed that the laundry room did not satisfy the features required for a single cell, saying it lacked a bunk and toilet even if it arguably met requirements for a lavatory, table, and seat. 

Deficiency 5: Inmate cash, jewelry, and other property in Martinez’s desk

One of the most consequential concerns involved inmate Joshua Cruz’s money and other property found in Martinez’s office. Martinez wrote that on November 10, 2025, he met with Cruz, who had brought $1,570 into the jail, and discussed whether some money could be deposited for commissary and hygiene items while leaving most of it untouched. Martinez said Cruz chose to deposit $220 and keep $1,350 for release, and that because Cruz is deaf, he wrote out the deposit amount on a Word document so Cruz could read and approve it before Lt. Resendez made the deposit. Martinez then addressed other property, writing that loose items such as “wallets, jewelry, cell phones, etc.” had been found in the property room, and that he had jailers bring them to him “so it can be kept in a more secure location,” which he described as “the most logical way to keep the property secure until it was returned to its rightful owner.” 

Investigators viewed that explanation as an admission of improper handling. The report says Martinez “effectively became Inmate Joshua Cruz’s fiduciary when he accepted Cruz’s $1,350 cash for ‘safe keeping,’” then cited Texas Penal Code 32.45, Misapplication of Fiduciary Property. The summary argued that keeping the money in “an unlocked desk drawer in an often-unlocked office” exposed it to “a substantial risk of loss,” whether by an inmate, trustee, or detention officer. Investigators further wrote that the “more prudent and jail industry acceptable response” would have been to turn found property over to the KCSO evidence custodian for storage in the controlled-entry evidence room instead of personally retaining it in an office desk. 

Deficiency 6: Compliance with multiple jail standards

The sixth concern was itself a cluster of standards, and Martinez attempted to answer them one by one. On temporary jailers supervising, he wrote that temp jailers “are not assigned to supervise shifts” and that a licensed jailer was always on duty. On inmate census, he wrote inmates were counted “twice per day during headcount, exceeding the standard of ‘no less than once per day.’” On contraband searches, he said shakedowns were conducted on a “random, unannounced basis” and documented. On inmate clothing and personal clothing, he said inmate clothing was issued “upon intake,” and that personal clothing was washed “if necessary” on intake. On inmate rules and regulations, grievances, exercise, sunlight, telephone, correspondence, commissary, visitation, and religious practices, he repeatedly stated that plans had been submitted to and approved by TCJS. On the weapons and ammunition procedure, however, Martinez admitted, “I was unaware of the weapons and ammunition procedure,” and wrote that the items in question were already in the office before January 1, 2025. 

Investigators then went through that group and challenged several of the answers. They noted that while schedules appeared to comply with the temp-jailer rule during a specified period, census records were undermined by the Rangel laundry-room issue because he was shown asleep outside his listed housing area when the census log said all inmates assigned to M1 were accounted for. On contraband, they said records showed searches on only 12 dates between January 1 and November 18, 2025, and that a drug-dog search on September 16, 2025, was omitted from the official Contraband Searches 2025 file even though the dog alerted on a “dead scent.” On clothing standards, investigators said video and photographs showed inmates wearing non-facility or street clothing despite Martinez’s claim that jail-issued clothing was provided and available in sufficient quantities. On personal clothing, they stressed that the standard says clothing “shall” be cleaned, treating Martinez’s “if necessary” response as contrary to the rule’s mandatory language. 

Investigators also directly challenged his answer on inmate rules and regulations. Martinez wrote that the rules accompanied every intake packet and were also available on inmate tablets, but the summary says inmates signed acknowledgments even though they were not actually given a copy to read, and that neither Lt. Resendez nor inmate Bryan Gutierrez could locate the rules on the tablets. The report says Pam Whitmill of Correct Commissary was present and later advised the investigator that the document was “indeed, unavailable on the inmates’ tablets and it had never been on the inmate tablet.” On sunlight, investigators said a recreation plan existed but did not articulate how the jail satisfied the separate Section 285.2 sunlight requirement, and they described an approved sunlight plan as “non-existent.” On the weapons and ammunition procedure, investigators stated that although Jail Standards required a written policy, “none currently exists for the KCSO Jail.” 

Deficiency 7: Transfer of murder suspect Severiano Valdonado to GEO

The packet then turned to Severiano Valdonado, described in the file as a murder suspect. Some portions of the affidavit response are redacted, but Martinez’s response includes his statement that the matter “was likely discussed and approved by the jail administration,” and that “No orders were given by any member of the command staff to keep Valdonado at the Karnes County Jail.” Martinez included text messages showing Sheriff Bailey asking whether the murder suspect was at GEO, then later responding, “The murderer should remain with us. All three of them should be separated. You can send one of the other ones there.” Martinez also wrote that Valdonado was later picked up from GEO for a court appearance and had since remained at the Karnes County Jail. 

Investigators said that response failed to cleanly answer the concern. They wrote that Martinez “avoided a specific answer” about who authorized the transfer and why, and criticized his references to vague group discussion rather than identifying a specific decision-maker. The summary says that when Sheriff Bailey and Lt. Carrothers transported Valdonado from the Travis County Jail to the Karnes County Jail, they told Martinez to keep him segregated until further notice.

Deficiency 8: Delay in warrant and complaint delivery for Valdonado

On the question of why Valdonado’s original warrant and complaint did not reach the district clerk for about two weeks, Martinez wrote, “I do not handle warrants/complaints. I will get with Lt. Resendez to see what the delay was on this particular warrant/complaint.” Investigators were unpersuaded. The summary states that, as Jail Administrator, Martinez had “full responsibility for the management and operational control of the jail,” and pointed out that Valdonado was booked October 24, 2025, but was not magistrated until October 30, 2025. The report then cites Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 15.17, which requires that an arrested person be taken before a magistrate “without unnecessary delay but not later than 48 hours.” 

Deficiency 9: Housing two Valdonado brothers together

When asked about the co-housing of two Valdonado brothers that led to a disturbance, Martinez quoted a text exchange. He wrote that on Sunday, October 26, 2025, Lt. Resendez texted him, “Also I went ahead and housed the valdonados together so we just have 1 tank if shit heads rather than have them yelling at each other all day.” Martinez responded, “Which valdonados?” and Resendez replied, “The other 2.” 

Investigators said the response was incomplete because it failed to address a subsequent disturbance involving the two brothers and their cellmates on October 29, 2025. The summary states that the “significant jail staff response” to that disturbance “likely would have been avoided if the Valdonado brothers were housed separately.” In that section, the report again uses Martinez’s own text evidence to show he knew of the housing arrangement, but investigators faulted him for not fully addressing the resulting security consequences. It is another example in the file where the response answered a narrow question but, in the investigators’ view, failed to grapple with the management implications. 

Deficiencies 10 and 11: Misfiled documents in inmate files

Two separate concerns involved documents found in the wrong inmate files. One was a TDCJ letter regarding Raven Renee Rodriguez, and the other was a property-release request for Travis Austin Hernandez. Martinez’s responses to both were nearly identical. For the TDCJ letter, he wrote, “Misfiled by whoever handled the paperwork.” For the property release document, he again wrote, “Misfiled by whoever handled the paperwork.” 

Deficiency 12: Missing Dylan Marks file and money orders

The investigation also raised the missing file of inmate Dylan Marks, along with three money orders totaling $1,500. Martinez wrote that Marks was released at the end of May 2025, and that once staff learned the file could not be found, both he and Lt. Resendez searched the jail file room and the administration-side file room. He said he personally went through every file in the jail, attempted to review surveillance footage but could not because the system only stores up to 120 days, and later conducted another thorough building-wide search after an email request from Lt. Carrothers. Martinez concluded, “Marks’ file could not be located.” 

The report elsewhere says current and released inmate files were “routinely stacked in the Jail Control Room,” making retrieval time-consuming and unreliable.

Deficiencies 13 and 14: How inmate files and personnel files were kept

When asked how jail inmate files were stored, Martinez answered that they were kept in the jail control room and separated between in-house inmates and GEO inmates, then moved to the jail’s file room after release. When asked where jail personnel and training records were kept, he answered, “Kept in the bottom right drawer of the Jail Administrator’s desk.”

The investigative summary says current and released inmate files had been “routinely stacked in the Jail Control Room requiring a diligent and time-consuming dig through the two stacks to find the desired file.” On personnel files, the summary quotes Chief Deputy Kotara as saying he was supposed to maintain all KCSO personnel and training files and had “repeatedly instructed Mace” to turn over any such files in his possession, but that the order “has been ignored to date.” Investigators also said Chief Kotara effectively ordered Martinez on August 6, August 21, and November 3, 2025, to develop an overtime form for jailers to justify overtime work, and wrote that Martinez “failed to obey this order” because the form was never developed.

Deficiency 15: Handling of inmate Felix Villarreal

Part of the fifteenth concern and part of Martinez’s corresponding response are redacted in the record, so the full underlying allegation cannot be fully reconstructed. Investigators’ summary, however, preserves a portion of the final sentence, writing, “The Medical Administrator (Andrea Bazan) confirmed” certain facts, and then criticizing what it described as a tendency “to have the attitude that explaining away [the situation] rather than focusing on the fact that methamphetamine or some other controlled substance somehow entered the closed jail environment and preventing future similar occurrences.”

Because of those redactions, the file does not permit a complete public accounting of Martinez’s full response on this one point.

Deficiency 16: Methamphetamine and other contraband found during shakedown

On the discovery of suspected methamphetamine during the November 19, 2025, dog-assisted shakedown, Martinez answered, “It is possible that inmate Rangel had access to this contraband while working outside with KCSO Maintenance. A search of Rangel should have been conducted each time he worked outside the jail’s secure area.”

Investigators said the response minimized the seriousness of the discovery. They wrote that Martinez appeared “to minimize the seriousness of the discovery of methamphetamine in the jail under his watch instead of concerning himself with determining the scope of the problem, how methamphetamine entered the jail environment, and how to prevent drugs and other contraband from entering the jail.” Elsewhere, the summary says the comprehensive shakedown using three drug dogs, CID investigators, and patrol deputies resulted in “multiple dog alerts for the presence of methamphetamine, including dead scents where drugs had recently been present.”

Deficiency 17: Shotgun shells and a knife in Martinez’s desk

The seventeenth concern involved two 20-gauge shotgun shells and a knife found in Martinez’s desk drawer during the November 19, 2025, shakedown. Martinez acknowledged the items and wrote, “These items were in the office prior to January 1, 2025. I accept full responsibility for failing to promptly remove these items from the office.”

Investigators nonetheless used the admission to reinforce their case. The summary says that on January 1, 2025, when Martinez apparently found those items, the proper response would have been to report them to Sheriff Bailey or Chief Deputy Kotara and turn them over to CID. The file also notes that during the shakedown, the seized contraband from the jail included “$1,350 inmate cash, a knife, and two 20 gauge shotgun shells in the Jail Administrator’s desk.”

Deficiency 18: Lack of confidence in jail leadership

The final listed concern was wider and more subjective, but investigators treated it seriously. Martinez responded at length, writing that he had “held several jailers accountable for their actions or lack thereof over the last 10 months,” that “Several write-ups have been documented and given to Chief Deputy Kotara,” and that he had adjusted schedules, helped on shift, answered questions, provided training, and made sure jailers got requested time off. Still, he also wrote, “Regarding the inmates’ lack of confidence in jail leadership, I’m not sure how to address it,” and argued that staff and inmates were pushing back because the administration had changed practices and was no longer letting them “always get what they want.” 

Investigators seized on that line. The summary calls it a “telling response” and says the statement “appears to indicate Mace is out-of-touch with conditions in the jail for which he is responsible.” The report says a review of personnel files in Martinez’s desk showed only three jail personnel had received no more than counseling since January 1, 2025, with two of four counseling documents occurring in November and two earlier documents pertaining to the same jailer. It also quotes Chief Kotara as saying Martinez inconsistently forwarded personnel documents and was “the only KCSO supervisor who violates this requirement” to send personnel files and documents to Kotara’s office.

Other issues investigators said surfaced during the inquiry

The packet also includes a separate section titled “Other KCSO Jail related issues discovered since the internal investigation began.” That section says TCJS program specialist Kailin Rickner emailed on November 26, 2025, that “We have not received the one-time pregnant inmate survey from Karnes County.” It says assorted knives confiscated from inmates during booking were found in the Jail Control Room, not tagged with owner information, and reportedly placed there by instruction. It also says inmate Sherry Kinney told Sheriff Bailey that inmates could use tablet logins to communicate with other inmates and coordinate contraband. 

That section adds even more operational detail. Investigators wrote that on August 6, 2025, Chief Deputy Kotara instructed Martinez to begin documenting discipline for jailers who slept on duty, but that Martinez failed to comply. The packet also says detention officer Ruth Rethaber reported multiple problems, including that Martinez “never answers his telephone” when she calls with an issue, that one jailer passed soup and crackers between inmates in different cells, that on November 13, 2025, “no jail census scans were performed” for more than two hours while on-duty jailers were “just sitting in booking,” and that another jailer was sleeping in dispatch around midnight on November 18, 2025. Finally, that section circles back to the November 5, 2024, written counseling over the deficient inmate-file audit and notes that despite signing it, Martinez “continued to fail in his quality assurance duty.” 

The investigators’ overall conclusion

The disciplinary packet never says Martinez committed one headline-grabbing act that alone triggered his firing. Instead, it constructs a cumulative case that he failed to exercise the level of oversight required by Policy 2.04. Across the packet, investigators repeatedly contrast Martinez’s responses, many of which emphasize delegation, misunderstanding, or inherited conditions, with their own position that the jail administrator bears continuing responsibility for compliance, correction, and control. By the time the matter reached the Disciplinary Review Board, the agency had assembled a record that it said showed repeated failures involving documentation, housing, inmate property, contraband, file storage, discipline, and compliance with state jail standards. 

The final page that matters most is also the simplest one. The December 17, 2025, discipline acknowledgment says the allegation under Policy 2.04 was “Sustained,” that the “Imposed Discipline” was “Termination of Employment,” and that the action was effective that day.

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